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Social capital has as its key element the value of social relationships to generate 
positive outcomes, both for the key parties involved and for wider society. Some 
authors have noted that social capital nevertheless has a dark side. There is a moral 
element to such a conceptualisation, yet there is scarce discussion of ethical elements 
within the social capital literature. In this paper ethical theory is applied to four 
traditions or approaches to economic social capital: neo-capitalism; 
network/reputation; neo-Tocquevellian; and development. Each is considered in 
detail, and subject to ethical analysis by the application of utilitarianism, Kantianism, 
justice and rights, and ethic of care. Accordingly the assumption that social capital is 
either value-neutral or a force for good is critiqued and a framework for 




Social capital understood as “the goodwill that is engendered by the fabric of social 
relations and that can be mobilized to facilitate action” (Adler and Kwon 2002: 17) – 
is a concept predicated on societal actors’ propensity to develop relationships with 
one another. If we judge the success of a concept by its adoption across different 
scholarly disciplines and practice, then social capital is triumphant. It has been used 
by those engaged with political science, development studies, sociology, urbanology, 
organization theory and management. Since Adler and Kwon (2002) and Lee (2009) 
have comprehensively reviewed social capital from a business and management 
perspective in general terms, it is not our purpose to repeat that here. Instead we build 
on and develop their work by enhancing our understanding of the dark side of social 
capital through a review of social capital from an ethics perspective.  
 
We argue that widespread enthusiasm to work with the intuitively appealing 
framework of social capital is hampered by an unwillingness to maintain a critical eye 
on its full ethical implications. Even business ethics scholars have been using social 
capital theory without reflecting seriously on associated ethical issues (Fuller and 
Tian 2006; Muthuri, Matten and Moon 2009; Russo and Perrini 2009; Spence and 
Schmidpeter 2003). The concept has strong links with familiar business ethics 
territory such as reciprocity, stakeholder relationships, community engagement, trust, 
development and social cohesion, and could arguably be of great value to our field, if 
handled carefully. Without a rounded critique of social capital, researchers - and 
ultimately managers and policy-makers acting on that research – run the risk of 
overlooking the ethical issues and consequences of endorsing the concept, and 
undermining any good which it may engender. The ethical issues around social capital 
are many and varied according to the perspective taken of both the social capital 
concept and ethics. It is our task to provide a nuanced analysis of a range of 
perspectives of social capital by applying ethical theory.  
 
The theoretical core of social capital is that aspects of social structure facilitate action 
for those within the structure; social capital is therefore concerned with examining 
patterns of embedded relations – built over time – that inhere in social structures and 
their ability to facilitate individual (micro), organizational (meso) and group (macro) 
level benefits. Social capital is thus a relational theory of social interaction which 
understands actors and their purposeful actions as inter-dependent.  
 
 “Intellectual and academic success does not come without controversy.” (Castiglione, 
Van Deth and Wolleb 2008: 1). In social capital’s case these controversies include 
questions over the legitimacy of the theory in terms of its definition, quantification 
and operationalization (e.g. Locke 1999). Social capital is burdened with a ‘plethora 
of definitions’ (Adam and Roncevik 2003: 158), which has generated a substantial 
sub-set of conceptual literature offering reviews and syntheses of this definitional 
diversity (Adler and Kwon 2002; Portes 1998; Paxton 1999; Field 2003; Lee 2009) as 
well as empirical research in business and management (for example Cohen and 
Fields 1999; Edelman et al 2004; Newell et al 2004; Hoffman et al 2005) and 
corporate social responsibility/business ethics (Spence, Schmidpeter and Habisch 
2004; Muthuri et al 2009; Russo and Perrini 2010). However, we agree that with 
Woolcock and Radin (2008: 412-413) that the focus on establishing a lexical and 




Thus, social capital can be understood as an ‘umbrella construct’ (Hirsch and Levin 
1999) or, using biological terminology, as “a genotype with many phenotypic 
applications” (Adam and Roncevic 2003: 158). Social capital’s antecedents and 
consequences are integrated and self-reinforcing: social capital is thus “…not 
unilinear but circular and multilinear” (Ibid: 178). Hence it is a concept which is at 
once both appealing in its apparent simplicity and complicated by its many and varied 
forms and applications.  
 
In seeking to narrow-down the version of social capital of relevance in the current 
paper, we focus on economic social capital, not least since that is the context for the 
business activity with which our research is concerned. This form of social capital is 
also the one adopted by most theoretical scholars of social capital, however, this paper 
will interpret social capital in its economic context as belonging to a social economics 
tradition originating in Polanyi’s analysis of the ‘disembedding’ of the economy from 
wider society (The Great Transformation 1944). There is a considerable difference  
between Karl Polanyi’s ‘fictitious commodities’ hankering after a pre-capitalist 
golden age and James Coleman’s ‘rational choice’ view of social capital. However, 
both interpretations share a critical view of the asocial nature of classical and neo-
classical economic perspectives originating in the Scottish Enlightenment. The socio-
economic analysis’ most significant scholars are the social network theorist Mark 
Granovetter (1973, 1985, 1992 and 2005) and in explicitly social capital terms, James 
Coleman (1998, 1990).  
 
The embedded view of social capital in the economy and the core understanding of 
social capital both refer to the processes that generate outcomes from social 
interaction and cooperation. These social capital processes have an ethical dimension 
because all interaction in social relationships, to a greater or lesser degree, has the 
potential for moral components (Pastoriza et al 2008). However, the ethical aspects of 
social capital have been described as ‘under-conceptualised’ (Preuss 2004: 154-164) 
and the explicit literature applying ethics to social capital is limited as we will go on 
to show.  
 
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section we apply ethical theories to 
themes within the economic approach of social capital (primarily neo-capitalism; 
network/reputation; neo-Tocquevellian; and development). We draw particularly on 
the most relevant ethical theories which we determine to be utilitarianism, justice, 
Kantianism and an ethic of care. We conclude by identifying the implications of our 
application of ethical theory to social capital for future researchers.  
 
Applying Ethics to Social Capital: Exploring the Dark Side 
 
Most approaches to social capital stress the positive externalities of social connections 
and informal relationships which are theorised to result in trust, shared norms, 
solidarity, and civic mindedness. As Field (2003: 71) observes: “there shines out a 
warm glow. Social capital’s ‘dark side’, by contrast, remains largely unknown 
terrain.”  However, a good number of authors do acknowledge the downsides to social 
capital including Edelman et al. (2004), Locke (1999), Leenders and Gabbay (1999) 
and Portes (1998). Others have applied social capital in empirical contexts to identify 
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negative aspects (e.g. in terms of class and entrepreneurship (Anderson and Miller 
2003), rural entrepreneurs (Kalantaridis and Bika 2006), behaviour of individual 
business people such as Bernard Madoff (Manning 2010), Danish business 
associations (Svendsen and Svendsen 2004) and community forestry (Wilshusen 
2009)).  Portes (1998: 15) summarises problematic aspects of social capital as being 
‘at least’ the exclusion of others, excessive claims on members of the group, 
restrictions on individual freedoms, group closure and the downward levelling of 
norms based on group solidarity. Other related outcomes include distrust and lack of 
cooperation, thereby impeding – rather than enhancing - economic progress. 
 
Putnam also recognises the potential limitations of the emphasis on shared norms, 
languages and networks, when he cautions over the ‘Dark Side of Social Capital’ 
(2000: 350-363) and concedes that there is a “...classic liberal objection to community 
ties: community restricts freedom and encourages intolerance.” (Ibid: 351) For 
example, in the 1950s a, “…surfeit of social capital seemed to impose conformity and 
social division” (Ibid: 352). This dark side is given voice in a collection of criticisms 
that interpret Putnam’s social capital as class based, and elitist for providing a 
bulwark in favour of the prevailing economic policies (Manning 2010). 
 
This can apply as much in the perpetuation of elites or key groups in the work place 
as in wider society, and is reminiscent of Bourdieu’s (1986) conceptualisation of 
social capital as relating to “privileged individuals (who) maintain their position by 
using their connections with other privileged people” (cited in Field 2003: 28). Based 
on this, it is easy to spot the potential moral deficiencies of social capital in simple 
statements such as those of Lin, defining social capital as, “embedded resources in the 
networks accessed and used to attain status.”(Lin 2001: 79) Social capital is premised 
on “investment in social relations with expected returns in the market place” (Ibid: 
19), or put simply: ‘It’s not just what you know but who you know.’ (Lin 2001: 40)  It 
is our task in the current paper to add some precision to these broad indications of 
ethical problems associated with social capital.  
 
In the business context, the ‘not what you know but who you know’ issue is discussed 
by Stevenson and Greenberg (2000: 652) commenting that: “some actors are enabled 
by their network position, and others are constrained”, i.e. there is no guarantee that 
the enabled individuals are necessarily the best. When it comes to, for example, 
knowledge-sharing, social capital, through its focus on a limited group of network 
‘insiders’ and by extension organizational ‘subgroups’, may hinder intrapreneurship 
and impose non-reciprocal obligations that lead to the organisation favouring the 
subgroup goals over the goals of the larger organization (Adler and Kwon 2002; 
Locke 1999; cited in Willem and Scarbrough 2006). On a broader business level, 
cartelisation and business friendships may lead to obligations to help each other and 
opportunities for collaboration (Adler and Kwon 2002). However they may also lead 
to lower productivity, higher prices, non-responsiveness to customer needs, lack of 
enterprise, stagnation and inefficiency (Ingram and Roberts 2000; Field 2003; Adler 
and Kwon 2002). At a societal level, a commonly quoted example develops this 
possibility into a basis for social exclusion: Puerto Rican drug dealers in New York, it 
is claimed, do everything to keep one another within the drug milieu, to the extent that 
it would be treason to mix with the whites in an attempt at social upward mobility 
(Portes 1998: 17).  
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The common theme is that when bonding social capital takes place within a well-
delineated and close-knit group, the resulting bonds can operate such that outside 
influences are excluded and damaging group norms enforced (Johnston and Percy-
Smith 2002), resulting in an aggregate loss for those inside the network and 
potentially the wider organization and/or society. 
 
To sum up the arguments regarding social capital’s ‘dark side’, it is a resource that 
can be subject to high levels of selectivity and manipulation by actors using it and 
those subject to it, and this can lead to great inequalities and perverse outcomes in the 
attainment of optimum ‘economic outcomes’. Such concerns lead Adler and Kwon to 
conclude that: “social capital research would benefit from a more systematic 
assessment of risks as well as benefits… One actor's social capital advantage is often 
another actor's disadvantage, and research on the differential access to social capital is 
therefore a high priority (Lin 1999)” (2002: 35). This is the basis for the current 
paper, which seeks to deepen our understanding of social capital’s dark side from an 
ethics perspective.  
 
Most social capital literature reviews are either structured to consider the theory by 
discussing key personages, usually designated as Bourdieu (1986), Coleman (1988; 
1990) and Putnam (2000; Field 2003) or thematically (Lesser 2000; Castiglione, Van 
Deth and Wolleb 2008). Both approaches are valid, however this review will take the 
latter thematic structure as its organising principle, since in this way traditions or 
approaches to social capital  most relevant to business can be discussed with direct 
reference to their ethical content and not through the filter of one of the key social 
capital authors. Our analysis of the social capital literature suggests the application of 
four different ethical theories which will reveal a range of ethical issues: 
utilitarianism, justice, Kantianism and the ethic of care. Table One at the end of this 
section summarizes the discussion.  
 
First, we introduce the approaches to social capital which position it as within the 
tradition of new-capitalism; as a network/reputation approach; as neo-
Tocquevellianism or as an approach to development. As shown in Table One, we then 
apply four ethical theories. It is not the purpose in this article to dwell on ethical 
theory per se, but to apply ethical theory to better understand the nuances of social 
capital. We assume a basic understanding of utilitarianism, justice, Kantianism and 
care prior to reading this article. Our choice of ethical theory is guided by the desire to 
incorporate a range of perspectives on moral behaviour, hence we chose an approach 
which looks at the consequences of actions (utilitarianism), the fairness of actions 
(justice), principals and duty (Kantianism) and relationships (care). The four theories 
chosen are done so because of their range and difference in terms of the focus of the 
judgment about ethical behaviour. There is also somewhat of a precedent in using 
these theories in business ethics, though we have sought not to be constrained by this 
but to choose theories which indeed are most relevant in assessing social capital. For 
example, the ethic of care is arguably the least commonly applied theory of these four, 
but because social capital is in part at least about relationships and that is the moral 
focus of the ethic of care, we deemed it to be highly relevant in this instancei. 
 
Social capital as neo-capitalism 
The first theme this analysis will address is social capital as neo-capitalism. Neo-
capitalist approaches share a common ‘capitalization’ perspective drawn from 
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economic terminology which focuses on the “investment of resources with expected 
returns in the marketplace. Capital is resources when these resources are invested and 
mobilized in the pursuit of profit-as a goal in action.” (Lin 2001: 3) Moreover, 
according to Ahn and Ostrom: “All forms of capital involve investments that increase 
the probability of higher returns from individuals and joint efforts over a future time 
period.”(2008: 72). This ‘neo-capital’ extension of economic theory drew inspiration 
from Adam Smith’s perception that “included all the acquired and useful abilities of 
the population in a country as part of capital.” (Lin 2001: 8)  
 
Such conceptualizations of social and economic activity resonate directly with the 
ethical theory of utilitarianism, a consequentialist theory which stresses the 
achievement of the long-term maximum utility for society as a whole, evaluating the 
moral worth of an action according to the results flowing from it. The principle of 
utility refers to the ethical goal of promoting overall welfare (Bentham 1789; Mill 
1859). In simple terms, this is often presented as a cost-benefit analysis wherein an 
action is morally right if it leads to the greatest good for the greatest number (the 
greatest happiness principle) and minimises harm.  
 
Of course, in a situation where it is the aggregate utility that counts, one person’s 
increase of utility may be offset by a reduction in that of another, alerting us to 
justice-based concerns with neo-capital theory perspectives on social capital (Rawls 
1971). As a result, utilitarianism is disadvantaged by the difficulty of allowing some 
to suffer because of the moral imperative of achieving the greatest good for the 
greatest number.  
 
In business ethics, the concept of utility is a popular model that has a wide 
application, which overlaps to a certain extent with the economic principle that is 
called, not coincidentally, utility maximisation. Fine and Green argue against 
“economics as a colonizing social science” (2000: 78-93), in which the neo-capital 
approach is to reduce individuals to forms of capital, using economic language to 
analyse social and relational phenomena. Indeed, in relation to its utilitarian 
underpinnings, social capital as a concept has been criticised by McCleneghan (2003: 
437) as representing, through the work of Granovetter (1985), Coleman (1988), Portes 
(1995) and Woolcock (2000): “an early incursion by neoclassical economics into 
sociological thought through rational choice theory, extended and developed through 
network theory”. There is a clear use of utilitarian language in her account of how, in 
this process, the ‘social’ element of social capital has become subordinated “to a 
particular form of economic theorizing. Everything, including relations of conflict, 
can now be viewed as forms of capital which, when they favour particularistic 
interests over the general good, are understood in terms of the concept’s ‘dark side’.” 
(McCleneghan 2003: 437) 
 
Social capital in networks and reputation 
The next two approaches to social capital flow from such concerns, and will be 
considered jointly, due to their strong interrelationship: the second approach is social 
capital in networks, and the third is social capital as reputation. Network theory is vast 
(for an overview see Nohria and Eccles 1992) and its relation to social capital 
disputed. According to Lin, social capital is a network theory (2001) and Burt also 
adopts a structural understanding of the concept (2000; 2005) as do Gargiulo & 
Bernassi (2000). However many social capital authors regard network claims to be 
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too insular and overblown. Putnam, for instance, argues that network theory is limited 
and quotes the Palo Alto Research Centre in relation to the ultimate network, the 
internet, saying: “that information itself needs a social context to be meaningful.” 
(2000: 172)  
 
It is not surprising that there are a number of ethical concerns over the network 
approach to social capital, given the universal claims made for this approach. The 
most important ethical issue, however, is rarely discussed, that is the 
instrumentalization of social relations which we can reframe in clear Kantian 
perspectives as using others as a means to one’s own ends. Thus, it has been argued 
that the network approach to social capital is overly mechanical and arguably strips 
individuals and groups of their emotional and instinctive need for social interaction, 
within a syntax more suited to computer circuitry. Moreover, Fukuyama has argued 
that: “Networks, understood as informal ethical relationships, are therefore associated 
with phenomena like nepotism, favouritism, intolerance, in-breeding, and non-
transparent, personalistic arrangements.” (2000: 202) Such perspectives are entirely in 
conflict with Kant’s moral imperative for univeralizability so that all individuals must 
be treated in the same way according to rational principles, rather than relationship 
based (i.e. he claimed we should not favour a relative over a stranger) (Kant 2005, 
orig. 1785).  
 
The issue of trust (Sobel 2002) is developed further in our third related theme of 
social capital as a reputation theory, which analyses levels of trust and credibility, and 
in the economic context conceptualises reputation as a capital asset to be promoted 
and protected. For example, from an economic understanding of social capital, 
Dasgupta (2005: 56) argues that the role of mutual enforcement in repeated 
interactions is to create “a creditable threat by members of a community that stiff 
sanctions would be imposed on anyone who broke an agreement could deter anyone 
from breaking it.” The threat’s credibility would be grounded in ‘rules of behaviour’ 
or social norms.  
 
This understanding of reputation belongs to a well-established research stream that 
examines reputation processes from a social perspective. Such a social capital analysis 
originated with Coleman’s vignettes on the New York diamond market and the Kahn 
el Khalili market of Cairo, in terms of network closure creating ‘obligations, 
expectations, trustworthiness of structures’ (Coleman 1988). Influenced by Coleman, 
and reflective of network theory, Burt has written extensively on reputation which he 
conceptualises as a relational asset (2005: 100-101). Burt also considers that the 
network closure reputation mechanism creates economic value by decreasing labour 
costs: “The more closed the network, the higher the quality and quantity of labor 
available at a given price within the network.” (Ibid: 148) This is due to deeply shared 
goals and peer pressure ensuring guilt-induced conformity. Burt illustrates this 
observation quoting approvingly of the late Apple CEO, Steve Jobs, on work teams: 
“The greatest people are self-managing. They don’t need to be managed. Once they 
know what to do, they’ll go out and figure how to do it.” (2005: 149) 
 
Putnam sought to distinguish between bonding and bridging social capital, arguing 
that the former is likely to have illiberal effects because it seeks to build networks of 
the already like-minded to the exclusion of others (Putnam 2000: 358). Bridging 
social capital, he argues, which builds connections across groups and is inclusive in 
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nature, offers the potential to solve some of society’s most intractable problems (ibid: 
363). Thus from a justice perspective, we can discern a problem of poorly distributed 
justice where bonding social capital is displayed – perhaps among a particular ethnic, 
religious or class group of society. Svendsen and Svendsen (2004), in their analysis of 
Danish dairy producers and sports halls, argue from an empirical basis that bridging 
social capital results in overall positive externalities for the common good, hence the 
suggestion of bridging social capital being associated with a justice perspective.  
 
Lin (1981) has written extensively on the connection between social capital and 
reputation and has developed the idea of relational rationality, with reference to 
Coleman’s notion of social credits; that is, ‘credit slips’ on which an actor in a 
network can draw if necessary (Coleman 1990: 306). In Coleman’s conception, 
“…creating obligations by doing favours can constitute a kind of insurance policy.” 
Thus unequal transactions create credits and debts, and result in different social 
standing, which is one understanding of reputation. Further examples of social capital 
interpretations of reputation include Fukuyama who equates reputation with 
recognition (1995: 359), Nahapiet and Ghoshal who view it as deriving from 
relational factors (1998: 252) and Putnam who understands reputation as a result of 
dense social networks (2000: 136).  
 
The ethical dimensions of the networking and reputation forms of social capital relate 
to the inter-connection of reputation with identity forming processes, coercion and 
free-will, and inequality. Forming reputation in a closed network may create ‘in’ and 
‘out’ groups and thus potentially lead to discrimination to the out group as well as to 
‘downward levelling norms’ (Portes 1998) to the ‘in’ group. For example, ethnic 
minority firms will often trade within a shared social network based on trust (Janjuha-
Jivraj 2003). However, these networks impose economic costs, in terms of being, for 
example, ‘welfare hotels’, and in terms of limiting growth. 
 
Burt’s duo-reputation hypotheses also have ethical dimensions, in terms of reputation 
ownership. In his first ‘bandwidth hypothesis’, the actor owns their reputation in the 
sense that they define their behaviour which in turn defines their reputation. However, 
under the second ‘echo hypothesis’, reputation is not owned by the individual, but 
rather is owned by “the people in whose conversations it is built, and the goal of those 
conversations is not accuracy so much as bonding between the speakers.” (Burt 2005: 
218) Thus in the second echo hypothesis: “The key to establishing a good reputation 
is to get people in closed networks talking to one another.” Moreover, under the echo 
hypothesis, first impressions are crucial for setting in chain favourable impressions. 
And: “Reputations do not emerge from good work directly so much as from 
colleagues’ stories about the work.” (Ibid: 218) How far this accords with reality 
remains to be investigated, however, it does suggest ethical implications in terms of 
how certain individuals and groups face discrimination in not possessing the right 
social credentials, or in the vernacular not having the ‘right school tie’.  
 
Social capital in its optimal form, then, seen from a utilitarian perspective, is in 
keeping with the neo-capitalist approach, provides benefits for the ‘broader 
aggregate’, ideally becoming ‘collective goods’ rather than the private property of the 
focal group who created and initially sought to benefit from it (Adler and Kwon 2002; 
Coleman 1988). These benefits of voluntary cooperation manifest, it is claimed, 
through the provision of macro and micro economic, political and social benefits, 
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such as a competitive and innovative business environment, trusting communities, 
better regional performance, improved health and education and so on, that all go to 
improve individual and societal well-being (Adler and Kwon 2002). From the 
utilitarian perspective, ‘pure’ public goods should not exclude ‘outsiders’ from the 
benefits developed and accrued by the insiders, nor should this apply in the reverse. 
 
However, as we have noted, the risks of the negative (perhaps unintended) 
externalities of bonding social capital in the form of, for example, social exclusion 
and over-embeddedness, the exercise of power, and blocks on innovation resulting in 
anti-competitiveness, among many others, are much in evidence in the social capital 
literature, showing that the optimum outcome of the common good is not achieved. 
Thus the extent and the ethical desirability that reputational and network approaches 
can achieve are both highly questionable. Putnam has conceded the disadvantages of 
strong communities restricting freedom and promoting intolerance. As he admits in a 
brief aside: “Networks, and the associated norms of reciprocity are generally good for 
those inside the network, but the external effects of social capital are by no means 
always positive….Therefore it is important to ask how the positive consequences of 
social capital – mutual support, cooperation, trust, institutional effectiveness – can be 
maximized and the negative manifestations – sectarianism, ethnocentrism, corruption 
– minimized” (Putnam 2000: 21-22). 
 
A further ethical implication of reputation and networks as ‘capital assets’ arises out 
of the assumption the poor cannot afford it, running contrary to views that interpret 
social capital as the only asset the poor possess. For example, research focussing on a 
poor US community, concluded that while creating and later paying of obligations is a 
cornerstone of social capital, deprived residents show an aversion to engagement in 
neighbourly actions, rejecting reciprocal indebtedness and avoiding relationships that 
would commit them to any obligations to others (Hutchinson 2004). Consideration of 
relationships leads us to the ethic of care (Gilligan 1982). From an ethic of care 
perspective this alerts us to some complex analytical quandaries around the 
implications when potential relationships are rejected because of the additional 
obligation, reciprocity and burden required where a relationship exists.  
 
The implications of approaches two and three chime very closely with arguments 
regarding social capital’s ‘dark side’. According to these concerns, some economic 
actors have social capital that is more useful than others. It is a resource that can be 
subject to high levels of selectivity and manipulation by actors using it and those 
subject to it, and this can lead to great inequalities and perverse outcomes in the 
attainment of optimum ‘economic outcomes’ (see for example Ayios (2003; 2004) for 
the perverse consequences of such forms of social capital on foreign investment in 
post-communist Russia). The utilitarian benefit of firm profitability can be threatened 
when innovation and entrepreneurship are thwarted through these processes, i.e. it is 
possible that there is over-reliance on the strong ties associated with dense networks 
of social capital and their resultant obligations (Granovetter 1973). The very norms 
and group identification that have the potential to increase organizational or group 
performance can, dependent on the focal actor, and the attendant network and 
assumptions of it, create barriers and inertia (Gargiulo and Bernassi 2000). Such 
concerns lead Adler and Kwon to conclude that: “One actor's social capital advantage 
is often another actor's disadvantage” (2002: 35). 
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Characterizations of social capital that deal with inequality bring the concept within 
the perspective of the ethic of justice, which emphasizes individual autonomy, choice 
and freedom, ensured through the preservation of equality, and enacted through rules 
that must be followed by all to ensure fairness for all, such that the least advantaged in 
society (often overlooked on a utilitarian analysis) gain the greatest benefit (see in 
particular Rawls 1971). Relationships in this context are established through respect 
for others’ rights and the observance of the attached obligations, established through 
the ‘highest principles’ (Held 2006; French and Weis 2000; Sevenhuijsen 2000). 
Portes (1998) has criticised social capital over its potential for exclusion, loss of 
individual freedom, insularity and excessive obligations. The trust and cooperation 
engendered through the focal group and its actors, while popularly seen as delivering 
positive outcomes, in reality have the potential to translate into a mistrust of outsiders 
and the generation of downwardly mobile group norms that discourage external 
cooperation and encourage selectivity and abuse. Social capital is both achieving and 
risking the utilitarian benefit of economic and societal prosperity through an unequal 
distribution of justice-based fairness and equal rights amongst certain members of the 
community who are bound by restrictive relationships and power imbalances.  
However, the utilitarian perspective, with its focus on aggregate welfare, may well 
trample individual needs and rights, reflecting a popular tension in the ethics 
literature, that: “Differing perspectives subordinate individual liberty to the primacy 
of the common good (Etzioni 1999) or call for individual liberty as the overriding 
principle” (Spence and Schmidpeter 2003: 94). 
 
The justice perspective therefore points to the problem of ‘negative freedom’, in the 
sense of standing in the way of a free or autonomous life (Giddens 1998). However, 
promoters of an ethic of care perspective may dispute such a perspective on social 
relations (Gilligan 1982; Held 2006). Rather than key principles of equal rights and 
the most extensive system of basic liberties being open to all, the ethic of care alerts 
us to the social element of social capital. This conceptualization of ethics will arise 
again during our analysis of theme five, below. 
 
Concerns over the instrumentalization of social relations inherent within the network 
approach also fall within the Kantian perspective. It is generally agreed (Micewski 
and Troy 2007; L’Etang 1992) that Kant’s “first and foremost formula” of the 
Categorical Imperative (Micewski and Troy 2007: 22) is universalizability, i.e. “Act 
only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should 
become a universal law” (L’Etang 1992; 742). When approaching the underpinnings 
of the network approach from this perspective, actors are first and foremost required 
to act always in such a way that everyone would agree on this being a rule or law for 
behaviour to which everyone would agree. However, it is the second element of the 
categorical imperative that captures attention in particular, with its emphasis on 
human relationships, i.e. that persons should never be treated as a means to an end, 
but only as an end in themselves – respect persons under all circumstances: “our most 
basic moral intuitions require a respect for persons” (Moberg and Meyer 1990: 866). 
The network approach only respects others in an instrumental way for what they can 
give to the recipient of such ‘social capital’, then potentially creating a rule for 
behaviour, or obligation for future reciprocity based on such a social exchange. 
Kantianism would find this immoral if one is using others as a means only, and 
therefore ignoring their nature as “autonomous agents” (ibid).  
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Social capital as Neo-Tocquevellianism  
To return to our social capital themes, the fourth theme concerns social capital as a 
neo-Tocquevellian theory and relates to the scholarship of two of the most influential 
theoretical authors Putnam and Fukuyama who both claim to be working within a de 
Tocquevellian tradition. For illustration, in Putnam’s evaluation de Tocqueville is “the 
patron saint of contemporary social capitalists” (2000: 292). Fukuyama (1995) also 
quotes liberally from de Tocqueville and is lavish in acknowledging his influence as 
“the most important theorist of social capital” (2000: 19). 
 
Moreover, Putnam’s central themes, with regard to civic community, (Ibid: 87-93) 
and Fukuyama’s emphasis on culture as an economic resource (1995) both have their 
antecedents in de Toqueville’s ‘Democracy in America’ (1835); that is, civic 
engagement, political equality, solidarity, trust, tolerance and associations as social 
structures of cooperation, are all identifiable Tocquevellian themes. Further these 
themes have been identified in an historical sequence of theories bolstering the 
prevailing socio-economic status quo (Paxton 1999: 88-127). For instance, Wheen 
notes (2004: 221) that President Clinton wrote an effusive letter to Amitai Etzioni 
praising his book, ‘The Spirit of Community’ (1993) and Etzioni’s moral and 
authoritarian communitarianism (1988) can be identified as an immediate precursor to 
Putnam and Fukuyama’s social capital in terms of theorising and diagnosing society’s 
ills, suggesting broad sweep remedies and also in the political attention that the theory 
garnered.  
 
The rational economic underpinnings of social capital, presented above under neo-
capitalism approaches, are strongly evident in such an account. However, such an 
understanding of social capital has been vigorously criticised from the political Left 
(Baron et al, 2000: 2; Levitas 2004: 41-56). In sum, according to critics, this 
Tocquevellian understanding of social capital is little more than anti-statist, 
authoritarian neo-communitarianism, which argues for more personal responsibilities 
and fewer rights. From this optic, Putnam and Fukuyama are read as advocating a new 
form of communitarianism, which stresses the need for the ‘civic deficit’ to be cut not 
by state intervention, for example by introducing a more progressive taxation regime; 
but rather by encouraging individuals to join ‘legitimate’ voluntary non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs). Therefore, the responsibility for social exclusion is shifted 
onto the poor: it becomes their individual responsibility to join in and improve their 
stock of social capital.  
 
The ethical aspects of this social capital understanding are the same as those levelled 
against communitarians, in terms of justice-based concerns over free will and the 
imposition of restrictive normative controls on non-conformists and the marginalised. 
Critics of contemporary capitalism would also argue that this version of social capital 
can be understood as falling within the parameters of Burkean conservatism with a 
stress on allegiance to the status quo and social harmony. The Tocquevellian version 
of social capital is thus supportive of the socio-economic status quo and belongs to the 
‘sociology of regulation’, concerned with emphasising unity and cohesiveness 
(Burrell and Morgan 1979: 10-20) to the detriment arguably of addressing ethical 
issues of increasing inequality, especially economic inequality. For example Levitas 
has concluded that social capital “simultaneously obscures and legitimates wider 
social inequalities, and provides a lens through which the rich become virtually 
invisible.” (2004: 49) 
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These views can be criticised on grounds of both utility and justice. Not only are the 
powerful selective in what and with whom they share knowledge and power, 
excluding some and including others, but those within and external to the network 
may find their freedom limited in terms of acceptable behaviour, obligations to key 
parties, and their abilities to exercise independent thought and behaviours, let alone 
(economic) development and self-determination. This leads to the creation of a ‘social 
prison’ (Portes 1998), and, as pointed out previously on utilitarianism, the goals and 
biases of the closely connected subgroup may then come to dominate the whole of 
society. Similarly, justice-based concerns over liberty and freedom in particular are a 
key criticism of communities who generate norms and obligations that those within 
them are committed to, and indeed which members will be loathe to deviate from for 
fear of becoming an outsider, or which they cannot break, because they are an 
outsider. Clearly, such norms are not concomitant with freedom of choice. 
 
Further, Kantianism’s second formulation of respect for persons again is applicable 
here in its rejection of instrumentalizing human relationships, although of course 
Kant’s overriding formulation of universalisability of laws for everyone is also 
highlighted here in the weakness of such an objective perspective. Specifically, 
Kant’s promotion of a universalising objectivity in the application of principles is 
countered by “evidence of Kant’s inability to account for the moral value of emotions 
and emotional attachments”, as typified through his idealised example of the cold-
hearted benefactor (Stohr 2002: 187). Returning to respect for persons as a guiding 
principle, Martin (1991) points out that if one respects another as an autonomous 
chooser, then “one should not choose another’s ends” (Ibid: 136). The ‘choosing’ by 
the ‘status quo’, ‘acceptable’ NGOs etc implies selective choosing by an elite ‘other’ 
on behalf of recipient ‘others’ who may not have been consulted over such a choice.  
 
Social capital as development  
The fifth theme is social capital as a form of development with an attempt to 
“reintroduce the social element into capitalism” (Baron et al 2000: 13). In 
methodological terms, to open up “the way for different approaches to modelling 
social relations, which address some of the moral and technical complexities of their 
protean character” (Ibid: 14). Thus in this tradition, social capital has instrumental 
value in capturing qualitative phenomena, which contrasts with the exclusively 
quantitative and asocial perspective that hitherto dominated. For example criticism 
has been levelled at development agencies, such as the World Trade Organization and 
International Monetary Fund for a reliance on overly quantitative models for analysis 
and policy recommendations. The argument was that these quantitative models failed 
to give adequate weight to the impact of social relations on economic activity and thus 
they inaccurately abstracted or dis-embedded economic activity from its social 
context.  
 
Fukuyama reaches the conclusion that social capital analysis is important because: “It 
constitutes the cultural component of modern societies” (1999: 1); and is often critical 
for understanding development. He also calls on anecdotal evidence to suggest that “it 
is difficult for outsiders to foster civil society where it has no local roots.” NGOs, 
“simply manage to create a stratum of local elites who become skilled at writing grant 
proposals; the organisations they found tend to have little durability once the outside 
source of funds dries up.” (2001: 18) Further, according to Wallis and Killerby (2004: 
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239) the “extraordinary outburst of research… has largely been motivated by 
academic and policy interest in the explanatory power of social capital with regard to 
spatial variation in economic and institutional performance.”  
 
Wallis and Killerby are of course talking of the utilitarian arguments and perspectives 
of social capital and the ‘optimum’ outcomes it can deliver. Brady (1985: 24) has a 
word of warning on such a view that could shed light on some of the policy concerns 
surrounding social capital, i.e. that “utilitarianism as a system of public decision-
making tends to suppress the expression of sympathy and other felt obligations... Any 
obligations or feelings of intrinsic worth, apart from human self-interest, are 
comparatively unimportant.” On this evaluation, homo economicus is seen as 
beholden to act rationally, instrumentally, motivated by extrinsic rewards, and 
behaving in isolation from others. Liedtka suggests that it is the shortcomings of this 
approach that has led to the “language of care and relationship-building … 
[appearing]… with prominence in the business literature, driven by the realities of the 
marketplace” (1996: 179). These ‘realities’ now reside in a realisation that traditional 
views of capital overlook the central role of economic actors interacting and 
organizing themselves in such a way as to create economic growth and development 
(World Bank: 1998). Indeed, social capital is “seldom defined so as to include 
feelings or emotions. Yet it is feelings of empathy and concern for others-developed 
through contact and interaction with them-that provide crucial reinforcement for trust 
and cooperation" (Schmid 2002: 751).  
 
Thus the ethic of care perspective would perceive of social capital as a medium for 
interaction that prioritizes the maintenance and nurture of ongoing responsibilities and 
relationships. Morality is viewed in terms of interconnectedness, focusing not on 
fairness, autonomy or universal principles, but on the creation and strengthening of 
relationships among individuals and their attendant responsibilities (Held 2006). Put 
succinctly: “An ethic of care is reflected in concern about how to fulfil conflicting 
responsibilities to different people, as opposed to questions of how to resolve claims 
of conflicting rights among them” (Simola 2003: 354). 
 
This ties in very closely with approaches to social capital, which view one of its core 
motives as the willingness of individuals to look beyond their own self-interest and, 
based on sympathy and caring, help those with whom they have an affinity (Schmid 
2002). The sympathy of an individual or group towards another individual or group 
“may produce a potential benefit, advantage, and preferential treatment for another 
person or group beyond that expected in an exchange relationship. Social capital 
resides in transacting, communicating individuals” (Schmid 2002: 750).  
 
This tension between ‘positive consequences’ rooted in notions of relationships and 
responsibilities towards the other and the ‘negative manifestations’ of elitism, 
insularity, behavioural control and corruption are closely tied to arguments comparing 
the ethic of care perspective with justice-based concerns over restrictions on freedom 
and inequality of power and status. While relationships are put at the centre of the 
ethic of care that sees them as crucial to properly understanding ethical decision 
making, Portes’ (1998) and Putnam’s (2000) ‘dark side’ discussions of their abuse in 
social capital terms are echoed in the ethics literature in terms of justice-based 
critiques of the care ethic. Communal discourses that are distorted and controlled by 
powerful agents are seen as subverting the goals of an ethic of responsibility (Dillard 
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and Yuthas 2001). The focal actor is bound through these community-based 
restrictions, and must be liberated through autonomy, as enacted through justice. 
 
Often, the caring dimension of social capital is neglected; in particular when 
highlighting the appropriability of social capital, personal relationships are seen as an 
asset of potential value to business or other instrumental causes. This suggests the 
instrumentalization of relationships to bringing positive consequences in spheres 
outside of personal life. The pursuit of social capital may override the pursuit of 
personal relationships for their own sake. Social capital has been found to bring 
benefits to individuals who operate successfully with it. However, the very value of 
social capital may be derived from a devaluation of friendship and kinship. Trying to 
build goodwill by cultivating friendship may be thwarted if the motivation is 
disingenuous (Perry 1999: 15).  
 
Again, we return here to Kantianism. The criticisms are similar to those against 
Kantian objectivity, however perverse this is in relation to his insistence on respect for 
persons such that they are not used as means to end. However, as shown above, Kant 
was also able to shed light on our concerns over the ‘paternalistic’ elements of 
development theory: “Kant’s ethical theory seems to be particularly good at 
explaining what is wrong with paternalism… it implies that manipulation of the other, 
even when this will result in his achieving his ends, is morally repugnant; it is 
preferable to allow the other to choose his own means, even when they are, in terms 
of his own aims, bad ones; or to reason with the other person and thus to respect his 
autonomy as a rational chooser” (Martin 1991: 136). Ironically for a moral theory 
much associated with ethical universalism, in such an account Kant is arguing for 
plurality in the achievement of the person subject to ‘development’ through 
autonomously choosing their own ‘route’ without interference from others who may 
hold alternative agendas, however benign those others’ intentions may be. 
 
Table One summarizes our findings when applying Utilitarianism, Kantianism, 




Insert Table one about here 
 
 
It is our contention that this table provides the basis for an understanding of social 
capital which acknowledges and highlights the ethical content of the concept. We do 
not seek to promote one ethical perspective approach over the other, rather it is our 
intention that both practitioners and scholars better understand the implications of 
their actions. Rather than focusing on how to generate and measure social capital, we 
wish to support a finer grained reflection on its nature. This work thus dovetails with 
the literature on the dark side of social capital which rightly highlights that it is not 
necessarily an absolute good. Our contribution is to clarify the different ethical issues 
likely to emerge according to a range of approaches to social capital. We chose four 
ethical theories and four social capital traditions to provide a wide ranging set of 
perspectives. One version of social capital and version of ethics would have been 





In this paper we have presented a detailed review of approaches and traditions of 
economic social capital and examined them through the application of ethical theory. 
In doing so we reveal the assumed perspectives which scholars of social capital imbue 
in their work. The most basic of these and the one which we seek to challenge with 
this paper is that social capital applied in business and management research is either 
value neutral or, simply put, a force for good. While research on social capital often 
briefly acknowledges what is called ‘the dark side’, very little goes beyond this to 
include a balanced ethical perspective within social capital research and accordingly 
more robust analysis. Our goal is thus to enhance the capacity of social capital 
researchers in the business and management field.  
 
Our key contribution is in the value of Table One which summarises the pertinent 
ethical issues relating to social capital. It is our hope that future social capital 
researchers will be able to use the table as a starting point for understanding the dark 
side of their chosen approach to social capital. For example, a researcher seeking to 
investigate social capital in terms of development, would be readily appraised of 
potential issues to look out for with respect to maximising social good, equitable 
societies, ensuring freedom of individual choice and the potential for 
instrumentalization of relationships. Hence the table offers a template of ethical issues 
for social capital researchers. We do not claim that this will be exhaustive, but we do 
propose that it will improve the depth and quality of social capital research if used 
carefully. A second contribution of this paper is to introduce social capital to business 
ethicists who have not previously had the opportunity to read work in this area. It is 
our hope that the paper inspires some business ethicists to learn more about social 
capital and reflect on the value of bringing ethical theory and social capital together.  
 
Importantly, we have distinguished between different traditions of economic social 
capital. We identify four key approaches of social capital, that is, social capital as 
neo-capitalism, in terms of network/reputation, as neo-Tocquevellianism and in terms 
of development. We sincerely encourage future scholars wishing to use social capital 
to distinguish between approaches to social capital as we have done, and in doing so 
address some of the complexity and confusion around definitions of this umbrella 
concept. We acknowledge that other traditions of social capital are also valid, and 
restricting our assessment to four is somewhat of a limitation. For example 
Bourdieu’s neo-Marxist inter-generational explanation of enduring class advantages is 
appropriate for examining educational attainment; e.g., the privileged student with the 
right social capital will be attuned to the cultural expectations of an Oxbridge 
interview and later will also have the social capital to be finessed into the most 
desirable ‘internship’ or occupation. (Field 2003: 16)   Halpern (2005) answers the 
question of ‘Why is social capital important’ by considering: economic performance; 
health and well being; crime; education; and government and the effective state. In 
addition to economic perspectives, Castiglione et al (2008) also consider the concept 
from the perspective of democratic politics, community and society. While these 
perspectives might not be as directly relevant to the business and management area as 




Our ethical analysis has been necessarily cursory, given our wish to include a range of 
ethical theories and social capital traditions. Future research might seek to deepen the 
analysis of anyone of the 16 quadrants in Table One. For example, it could be that 
there is substantially more to be said about the application of Kantian theory to 
network approaches to social capital. Building on this, we have sought to give 
relatively equal weight to the four ethical theories applied. Others might usefully seek 
to argue that one or perhaps two of the theories are most pertinent and their 
application should be extended.  
 
The ethical theories we have drawn upon – utilitarianism, justice, Kantianism and 
ethic of care – are in our view the most salient for economic social capital theory. 
However, others may also be relevant. For example, if the individual actors are the 
focus of social capital research, then it would be valid to engage with virtue theory 
which studies the character of the individual (as has been done by Preuss 2004). As 
we have revealed in this paper, applying different ethical theories frequently results in 
contradictory analysis of the ethics of a situation. This is the nature of ethics, and it is 
the task of the researcher to explicate the associated issues and determine the priority 
of the different perspectives.  
 
The current paper is theoretical in nature, but we would attach considerable value to 
empirical work which seeks to verify and critique the theoretical observations we 
have made. This would strengthen the credibility of our analysis and extend its value 
considerably. There is a strong stream of empirical work around small business, 
entrepreneurship and social capital which we have cited in our discussions. This 
would be suitable territory for expanding our work on the ethics of social capital. 
Indeed, there is likely to be some considerable opportunity in the growing context of 
social entrepreneurship, where social priorities are at least equal to financial ones, 
adding an intriguing layer to social capital analysis.   
 
It is our hope that this paper has implications beyond the academic. Social capital 
research is desirable to practitioners as a result of its promise of social and economic 
improvement. Developing an ethics perspective in social capital research should, in 
improving the robustness and the rounded reflection within research, also positively 
influence practice and policy. Our ethical application can help practitioners and policy 
makers to guard against negative unintended consequences of promoting social 
capital. We strongly recommend that research with a specific practical focus engages 
with the ethical perspective in social capital.   
 
Each of our recommendations for future research is applied specifically to business 
and management, but to return to where this paper started, with the wide disciplinary 
interest in social capital, researchers in other contexts (urbanology, sociology, 
community development and planning etc) should also engage with the ethical issues 
of applying the concept, and in doing so problematize its sometimes simplistic and 
narrow treatment.  
 
In conclusion, in this article we have sought to provide “some balance to the 
frequently celebratory tone with which the concept [of social capital] is surrounded” 
(Portes 1998: 3) by applying ethical theory. This we argue is important for the 
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Table One: Summary of the application of ethical theory to four traditions of social capital  

































Utilitarianism Justice Kantianism Ethic of Care 
Neo-capitalism  Close alignment between 
neo-capital theory and 
utilitarianism. Social 
capital is seen as 
providing collective 
social goods and 
aggregate welfare.  
Subjugation of the needs of some 
in order to achieve the greater 
good results in distributive justice 
concerns. Particular concerns 
where it is the most disadvantaged 
who pay the price for the 
advantaged.  
Individuals identified as forms 
of capital rather than being 
afforded individual respect for 
persons.  
No account taken of relationships, rather an 
assumption of people as rational, economic 




The perspective of the 
pursuit of the greater 
good is dominant but not 
necessarily 
commensurate with the 
pursuit of individual 
goals. 
Closed networks may create ‘in’ 
and ‘out’ groups and be a forum 
for coercion and inequality by 
social exclusion. This is a more 
commonly acknowledged ‘dark 
side’ of social capital in terms of 
bridging and bonding.  
Instrumentalization of social 
relations and reputation - 
using others as a means to an 
end. Goes against Kant’s 
universalizability imperative 
by promoting favouritism and 
nepotism.  
Undermines the value of genuine 
relationships and promotes relationships built 
for personal gain which are contrary to an 
ethic of care, except where in doing so close 
personal relationships benefit. Complex 
analysis needed of the resistance, for 
example of the poor, to enter into 
relationships which will create obligations.   
Neo-
Tocquevellianism  
Utilitarian claims by the 
powerful to meet their 
goals subjugate the needs 
of the less powerful. 
Responsibility for social inclusion 
shifted onto the excluded. State 
abdicates welfare responsibilities 
to individuals, communities and 
NGOs. Imposition of preferred 
norms goes against liberty and free 
will of individuals.  
Fundamental aspect of 
Kantianism, demonstrating 
that respect for persons is 
violated. 
Protecting those with whom there is a 
relationship could be in keeping with an ethic 
of care.  
Development  Assumption of optimum 
returns by promoting 
social capital ‘creation’. 
Enabling more equitable societies 
and protection for the least well off 
is commensurate with a justice 
based approach.  
Individuals should be allowed 
to formulate their own 
rationally arrived at choices, 
not guided by a pre-
established development 
agenda.  
Feelings of empathy and concern for others 
embraced but at the cost of the rights of 
individuals and elitism. Instrumentalization 
of relationships is inappropriate according to 
an ethic of care. 
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i
 For an introduction to ethical theory in the context of business ethics we recommend some of the best established text books in this area such as Velasquez (2012) and Crane 
and Matten (2010). There is also an argument for the inclusion of virtue theory, but this has been treated adequately by Preuss (2004).    
